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RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN
PRIOR STATEMENTS OF A WITNESS:
A NETTLESOME CORNER OF THE
HEARSAY THICKET
In Tome v United States,1 for the fifth time in eight years, the Su-
preme Court decided a case presenting the problem of how a
child's allegations of sexual abuse should be presented in court.-
Often the child who charges that an adult abused her is unable to
testify at trial, or at least unable to testify effectively under standard
procedures. These cases therefore raise intriguing and difficult
questions related to the rule against hearsay and to an accused's
right under the Sixth Amendment to confront the witnesses against
him.
One would hardly guess that, however, from the rather arid de-
bate in Tome, which focused on a seemingly technical question
concerning the interpretation of a provision in the hearsay portion
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In this article, I will examine
both that question and some of the broader issues surrounding it.
I will use Tome as a vehicle to explore what I believe is the impov-
erished state of the law concerning the admissibility of prior state-
ments of a witness. This state, I will argue, is attributable in part
to the Court's longstanding unwillingness to recognize that a party
Richard D. Friedman is Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
AuTHOR'S NOTE: Many thanks to Roger Park for his comments-characteristically percep-
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'See also Coy v Iowa, 487 US 1012 (1987); Idaho v Wight, 497 US 805 (1990); Maryland
v Craig, 497 US 836 (1990); White v Illinois, 502 US 346 (1992).
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may be substantially hindered in attempting to examine a witness
with respect to a prior statement the truth of which the witness
no longer affirms. A complete solution to the problem, however,
would require a dramatic restructuring of the law of hearsay and
confrontation, a prospect that I will touch on only briefly in the
conclusion to this article.
I. THE TOME CASE: FACTS AND OPIrIONS
As in other cases of alleged child sexual abuse, the transcript
in Tome makes heartbreaking reading; one way or the other, some-
thing horrible has happened.
Matthew and Beverly Tome divorced in September 1988. They
had a daughter, then approximately three years and three months
old, decorously referred to by the Court as A.T. The parents were
awarded joint custody, with Matthew having primary physical cus-
tody. During most of the time of concern, he lived on the Navajo
Indian Reservation in New Mexico and Beverly lived in Colorado.
In August 1990, Beverly, remarried and surnamed Padilla, pre-
sented Colorado authorities with allegations that Tome had sexu-
ally molested AT. Tome was charged with sexual abuse of a child
in violation of several federal statutes, the superseding indictment
specifying four separate types of improper contact.3 The conduct
allegedly commenced in aboutJune 1989, when A.T. turned four.4
Tome's trial, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Mexico, did not begin until February 1992. A.T.-by then approx-
imately six years, eight months old-was the Government's first
witness. After she was questioned extensively about her ability to
distinguish truth from a lie, the court allowed her to testify.' Her
testimony on direct examination consisted largely of one- and two-
word answers to leading questions, assisted by the use of dolls.
' They were contact between the penis and the vulva; contact between the mouth and
the penis; contact between the mouth and the vulva; improper penetration of the genital
opening by hand and finger. Transcript () 760-61. See 18 USC § 2246(2), formerly
§ 2245(2), defining "sexual ace' to include these types of conduct. The conduct alleged
was in violation of 18 USC § 1153, making a federal offense of certain crimes committed by
an Indian "within Indian country," and of 18 USC § 2241(c), which criminalizes knowing
engagement in a "sexual act" with a child under twelve "in the special maritime and territo-
rial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison."
4Joint Appendix (JA) 2.
5 Transcript (T) 69-80.
[1995
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A.T. testified, in effect, that on one occasion Tome removed their
clothes, got on top of her, and put his "private place" where she
went "potty" and in her mouth.6 After this happened, she said, she
went to the bathroom and wiped blood off herself 7 Extracting her
testimony was a slow process, apparently painful all around; the
prosecutor explained, outside the hearing of the jury, that A.T.
was "very frightened" of Matthew Tome.'
The defense cross-examined A.T. for a total of about an hour
and a quarter,9 first on a Monday afternoon and then again on the
Wednesday morning. Much of the examination concerned various
6
Q: Did daddy take your clothes off, yes or no?
A Yes.
Q: Okay. Did daddy take his clothes off?
A Yes.
Q: What did you do with your legs? What did you do?
A- I crossed it.
Q: ... Did daddy do anything?
A Yes.
Q: And what did daddy do? Go ahead.
A He got on top of me.
Q: ... Did he do something?
A- Yes.
Q: Was it good something or bad something?
A Bad.
Q: It was bad. Did it hurt or did it feel good?
AK Hurt.
Q: ... Did he put his private place any place on you?
A. Yes.
Q: Where did daddy place his private place, just point, point to me. Point to
where you are looking right now...Q: What do you call this place? What is that place on you? Do you have a name
for that?
A. No.
Q: You don't call it anything? Do you go potty there?
K Yes.Q: Okay. And Andrea, where did your daddy place his private thing, anywhere
else? And point to me if he did, where. Point to my body wherever he put it.
Where? Is that my mouth you are pointing at? Say yes or no.
A Yes.Q: All right. Did he put his private thing in your mouth?
A. Yes.
T 88-89, 90, 92-93, quoted in part in Petitioner's Brief.
'T 93-94.
8T 91.
9 T 166.
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background issues, such as reasons why A.T. might prefer to live
with her mother in Colorado rather than with her father in New
Mexico. This line of questioning was clearly intended to support
a contention that A.T. had fabricated the allegation of abuse, per-
haps at the instigation of her mother, in order to secure a change
in her custody arrangement.
In the first session, A.T. gave immediate answers, some in
relatively detailed sentences. When A.T. resumed testifying on
Wednesday, however, matters were far more strained. Sometimes
she answered only after a long interval, estimated by the trial judge
to run as much as 45 or 50 seconds, and in the end she provided
no audible or discernible responses even to some very simple ques-
tions.' ° During a recess, the judge noted for the record that
the witness seemed to be losing concentration. She would look
up to the ceiling, would look to the back of the courtroom,
she would look over my head, would not in instances face
counsel who is inquiring of her.
She twisted and turned, stretched a little bit sometimes. At
other times she would put her hand to her mouth and clasp
her lips with her hand. We have a very difficult situation here."
After A.T. completed her testimony, the Government was al-
lowed to present testimony of several prior statements by A.T.
concerning the alleged abuse. It was the admissibility of these
statements that created the issue that the Supreme Court chose to
review, so it is worth examining them in detail.
Lisa Rocha, a friend of Padilla, testified to a conversation that
occurred when she was baby-sitting A.T. on August 22, 1990-
more than a year after the alleged molestation. At this time, A.T.
was concluding a summer in her mother's custody; Padilla was
continuing to seek primary custody, but she evidently expected to
return A.T. to Tome, 12 and the next day she was to bring A.T. to
New Mexico for a hearing that had been scheduled for August
24.13 Rocha testified that A.T. said spontaneously, "Please don't
"S T 12 5-62. In a few cases, the difficulty may have been attributable to defense counsel's
failure to phrase the question in a way the girl was likely to understand, see T 141, 145,
but, as the court indicated, this was not the principal problem. T 147.
"T 147-48, 3 F3d at 348 n 4.
'IT 230.
" T 393, 401-04. In fact, the hearing had been rescheduled for August 22, T 533, so
Padilla missed it. T 537-38.
[1995
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let my mom take [me] back to my father." When Rocha asked her
why, the girl responded, "Because I don't want to go back."
Pressed further, A.T. said, "Because my father gets drunk and he
thinks I'm his wife." 4
According to Rocha, she told Padilla about this conversation
only after Padilla returned from New Mexico, still with A.T.,15 on
August 26. After Padilla's unsuccessful effort the next day to get
more information from A.T., Rocha questioned A.T. again.16 This
time, according to Rocha, A.T. told her that her father "does nas-
ties" to her, and elaborated by saying that (apparently on one occa-
sion) he dragged her through the house by her arms, took her
clothes off, forced her legs open, and lay on top of her, which gave
her a sharp pain near her stomach. When she cried for her mother,
her father told her, "Your mother's a bitch." Furthermore, A.T.
related that when she wiped herself the tissue was bloody.17
After this conversation, Padilla reported the allegation to the
police." Kae Ecklebarger, a Child Protection Service caseworker
assigned to the case, testified that on August 29, 1990, Padilla and
Rocha informed her of the allegation and that she then interviewed
A.T.19 Ecklebarger asked A.T. if she knew why she was there, and
A.T. said it was because of what "Matthew" had done to her. A.T.
said that she could remember one time particularly clearly. Her
father had told her to remove her clothes, and when she refused
he took off her panties, put her on the floor, and "put his balls"
in her. Using anatomically correct dolls, A.T. simulated inter-
course, and also told Ecklebarger that Tome had kissed her all
over her body, including the vaginal area. Ecklebarger also testified
that A.T. told her that her father asked her to touch his penis and
that she refused. A.T. told once more about wiping herself with
a tissue and finding blood, and added that she had shown it to her
14 JA 11-12, T 218-19.
11 Apparently on the advice of counsel Padilla returned to Colorado after she missed the
hearing, T 404, 447; eventually, after the charges of abuse were made, she was awarded
physical custody. T 541-43, 640.
16T 220-22. Padilla was listening from an adjoining room and was able to confirm
Rocha's testimony only in small part. T 239, 408, JA 20.
1JA 12, T 222-23.
I Rocha suggested to Padilla that if Padilla made a report to the police she would not
have to return A-T. T 450, 451.
19T 340.
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grandmother and aunt, Tome's mother and sister.20 A.T. said that
he had engaged in this conduct "every single day" for a time be-
fore stopping.2
1
Ecklebarger referred the case to Karen Kuper, a pediatrician. 2
Dr. Kuper testified that she interviewed A.T. with Padilla present
and that when she asked whether anyone had ever touched her in
a way that hurt or was scary A.T. answered, "Just my dad." With
the help of anatomical dolls, A.T. said that Tome had touched her
vaginal area and put his fingers and his "thing" inside her there.23
Another pediatrician, Laura Reich, testified that she examined
A.T. on September 21, 1990, for a rash that was apparently unre-
lated to sexual abuse. During the examination, she asked A.T. if
anybody had touched her in her vaginal area and A.T. responded
that her father had put his "thing" in her.24 A third pediatrician,
Jean Spiegel, who was an expert in child sexual abuse, examined
A.T. on September 3, 1991, about two years after the alleged
abuse. Dr. Spiegel testified that A.T. told her, in response to direct
questions, that Tome had touched her breasts, her "front pri-
vates," and "her bottom where her poop comes out.'"25
The pediatricians each testified to physical evidence suggesting
sexual abuse; Reich spoke most strongly, concluding that A.T.
"had definitely had penile penetration in her vaginal area. '26 Tome
testified in his own defense, denying that he had abused his daugh-
ter.27 His mother and sister also testified for him, denying that
A.T. had ever shown them a bloody tissue,28 and several witnesses
testified as to his good character.29 He was not permitted to intro-
duce evidence that he had passed a polygraph test denying that he
had abused A.T.3° The jury returned a verdict of guilty, with an-
20JA 16-19, T 317-20.
21JA 19, T 326.
2 2T 341.
23JA 15, T 255-56.
24JA 16, T 290, 292, 298.
25JA 20, T 509.
16 T 294. See also T 259-62 (Kuper), 472-73 (Spiegel).
2 7 T 642.
2 T 607 (sister), 620, 622 (mother).
29T 655, 660-61, 665, 671.
" Record on Appeal, 10 Cir, vol 1, at 5-17.
[1995
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swers to special interrogatories finding that he committed the four
types of illicit acts charged,31 and the court imposed a sentence of
12 years' imprisonment.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
judgment of conviction. The principal issue was the admissibility
of A.T.'s out-of-court statements. The Court of Appeals held that
all of the statements were admissible under Federal Rules of Evi-
dence 801(d)(1)(B),32 which provides:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay.-A statement is not
hearsay if-
(1) Prior statement by witness.-The declarant testifies at
the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination con-
cerning the statement, and the statement is... (B) consistent
with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express
or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication
or improper influence or motive ....
The court held that A.T. had been adequately subjected to
cross-examination (for purposes of both the evidentiary rule and
the confrontation clause), notwithstanding her unresponsiveness to
some questions, and that Tome had made at least an implicit
charge that she fabricated her testimony out of a preference to live
with her mother. Tome argued, however, that the Rule could
apply only to statements made before the alleged motive to fabri-
cate arose; in this case, he contended, A.T. had made the state-
ments after the motive, her desire to live with her mother, had
arisen.
Several Courts of Appeals had indeed held that the Rule incor-
porates a "premotive" requirement. 3 But in Tome the Tenth Cir-
cuit aligned itself with those Courts of Appeals that had refused
to recognize the requirement. 4 It conceded "that prior consistent
statements made after a strong motive to lie has arisen may evi-
3 These are listed in note 3.
31This was the principal basis on which the trial court had held the prior statements
admissible, though it also held some of them admissible on alternative grounds, such as
the hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment,
Rule 803(4).
3' See, for example, United States v Henderson, 717 F2d 135, 138 (4th Cir 1983); United
States v Bownan, 798 F2d 333, 338 (8th Cir 1986). The decisions adopting this view had,
at least for the most part, done so quite casually. See note 108.
H4 See, for example, United States v Montague, 958 F2d 1094, 1096-99 (DC Cir 1992);
United States v Pendas-Martinez, 845 F2d 938, 942 n 6 (11th Cir 1988).
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dence only that the declarant is a consistent liar. 3 5 Nonetheless,
it declined to find an absolute requirement that the statement
precede the motive; rather, it regarded the determinative factor
to be "whether a statement has probative value apart from its
repetition."36
However useful that standard may be, the Court of Appeals' ap-
plication of it-later to find favor by four members of the Supreme
Court37-was remarkably slipshod: The court's discussion centered
on the conclusory declaration that it did not find persuasive
Tome's underlying argument that an improper motive led to the
testimony. Apart from a reference to the apparent spontaneity of
A.T.'s initial statement to Rocha, however, the Court of Appeals
did not explain how the prior statements made Tome's argument
less persuasive.38
The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the single
question of whether Rule 801(d)(1)(B) incorporates a "premotive"
requirement. By a five-four vote, the Court held that it does.
Hence, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed and
the case remanded.
Justice Kennedy wrote the prevailing opinion, most of which
was for a majority of the Court.39 In his view, under the common
313 F3d at 350.
36 Id.
" 115 S Ct at 710 (Breyer, J, dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, CJ, and O'Connor and
Thomas, JJ).
3' Applying this analysis to the present case, we conclude that the district court prop-
erly admitted evidence of A.T.'s prior consistent statements under Rule
801(d)(1)(B). The record reveals that A.T. spontaneously made her initial allega-
tion of abuse to her baby-sitter. On cross-examination, Tome implied that A.T.
fabricated the allegations about her father because she wanted to live with her
mother. Although this argument does present some motive to lie, we do not be-
lieve that it is a particularly strong one. Moreover, Tome's contention would re-
quire us to believe that A.T.'s statements were the result of a calculated scheme
to deceive. Yet Tome has presented no evidence that the five-year-old A.T. pos-
sessed the ability to appreciate the causal relationships inherent in the conception
and implementation of such a scheme. Under these circumstances, we believe that
A.T.'s consistent statements do carry probative force apart from mere repetition.
We therefore find no abuse of discretion in admitting these prior consistent
statements.
3 F3d at 351 (footnotes, citations omitted).
39 justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined fully in the opinion. Justice Scalia con-
curred in the judgment and in all but one part of the opinion. He did not concur in Part
IB of the opinion, addressing the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules, because
in his view that Part gave undue weight to the Notes, not merely treating them as a re-
[1995
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law rule prevailing before adoption of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence in 1975, a statement previously made by a witness and con-
sistent with the witness's testimony could be introduced to rebut
a charge that the witness's testimony was a product of recent fabri-
cation or improper influence or motive-but only "if the state-
ment had been made before the alleged fabrication, influence, or
motive came into being."' The Federal Rules left this premotive
requirement unchanged, according to the Court, but expanded the
purposes for which evidence satisfying it could be admitted. Ordi-
narily, a prior statement by a witness, like out-of-court statements
generally, is hearsay, under both the common law and the Federal
Rules, when offered to prove the truth of a matter asserted in the
statement. Rule 801(d)(1), however, excludes from the definition
of hearsay-and so exempts from the rule against hearsay-three
categories of prior statements by a declarant who becomes a wit-
ness at trial. One of those categories, stated in subdivision (B), is
for consistent statements offered to rebut a charge of fabrication
or improper influence or motive. Thus, the Court concluded that
the premotive requirement was simply carried over to the new,
substantive use of the evidence. 41
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor and Thomas. Writing his first opinion on the
Court, Justice Breyer went to some pain to emphasize that Rule
801(d)(1)(B) does not itself establish the premotive requirement:
The Rule merely accords nonhearsay treatment to certain state-
ments that could already be admissible for rehabilitation, and
whether the statement was made before or after the motive arose
appeared to have no bearing on the applicability of hearsay pol-
icy.4 The key question, rather, was one of relevance-that is,
whether a prior statement consistent with the witness's trial testi-
mony might have sufficient probative value to warrant admissibility
in rebutting a charge of recent fabrication even though the state-
ment was made after the motive to fabricate arose. And the dissent-
ers concluded that the common law statement of a premotive re-
spected and ordinarily persuasive source of scholarly commentary but according them au-
thority in disclosing the purpose of the drafters. 115 S Ct at 706.
40 115 S Ct at 700.
41 Id at 703-04.
41 Id at 707-08. Justice Breyer's attempt to read a hearsay policy into the Rule is discussed
briefly below in note 86 and the accompanying text.
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quirement did not compel the Court to give an absolute negative
answer to that question.
In most circumstances, the dissenters acknowledged, a postmo-
tive statement would not have significant probative value in rebut-
ting a charge of recent fabrication based on an improper motive.43
But this, they contended, was not uniformly true; thus, some pre-
Rules courts, albeit a minority, did recognize that the premotive
requirement was not absolute. 44 The general tendency toward lib-
erality in the admissibility of evidence reflected by the Rules, and
the absence of any language in the Rules establishing such a re-
quirement, weighed against incorporating the requirement into the
Rules. 4
In this case, the Court of Appeals, applying an approach similar
to that advocated by the dissenting Justices, had "decided that
A.T.'s prior consistent statements were probative on the question
of whether her story as a witness reflected a motive to lie." This
was a "factbound conclusion" that the dissenters found "no reason
to reevaluate." 46 Hence, they would have affirmed the judgment
of the Court of Appeals.
Behind the narrow problem resolved by Tome lurk significant
issues that escaped analysis by either the Court or the dissent. First
is the basis for the traditional doctrine, significantly modified but
not abrogated by the Federal Rules of Evidence, that prior state-
ments of a witness are hearsay. This doctrine was crucial to the
case, for if there were no presumptive hearsay obstacle to the ad-
missibility of A.T.'s prior statements, there would have been no
need to explore whether the statements fit within the exemption
provided by Rule 801(d)(1)(B). The Court did treat the statements
as hearsay, but it did not explain why that might be sensible;
to the contrary, it rather conclusorily suggested doubt about the
persuasiveness of the traditional doctrine. In doing so, it implic-
itly followed a line of cases in which the Court has treated cross-
examination as adequate notwithstanding that the prior state-
431 Id at 710.
44 Id at 708.
45 Id at 709.
41Id at 710.
[1995
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ment includes propositions that the witness did not assert in her
testimony. In Part II, I will challenge this treatment.
In Part III, I will focus on what are generally referred to as prior
consistent statements, the subject of Rule 801(d)(1)(B). In Tome,
the Court interpreted that Rule as making admissible for substan-
tive purposes prior consistent statements that otherwise would be
admissible only for rehabilitation of the witness's credibility-but
it failed to articulate the distinction between these two grounds of
admissibility. Without examining whether there is any substance
to this distinction, it is difficult to appreciate fully what was at
stake in Tome. I will argue that the distinction is an important one
when the prior statement includes assertions that the current testi-
mony does not.
With this grounding, in Part IV I will narrow the focus further
and analyze, within the framework of current law, the particular
issue resolved by the Court. I will conclude that the rationale un-
derlying Rule 801(d)(1)(B) would be better served without an abso-
lute premotive requirement. In Part V, I show how the Rule ought
to be applied in a case like Tome. Finally, in Part VI I conclude
with some hints as to how the case might be decided in a radically
different framework that would be sensitive to two factors that ap-
pear to have had no impact on the Court's analysis: The opponent
of the evidence was a criminal defendant whose confrontation
rights might have been at peril, and the witness was a child.
II. THE HiNDRANcE IssuE: EXAMINING A WITNESS ON
ASSERTIONS SHE No LONGER AFFIRMS
The basic definition of hearsay contained in Federal Rules
of Evidence 801(c) follows traditional lines:
"'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." 47
But why should the definition extend to prior statements made by
a witness? That is, why does the italicized passage not read some-
thing like "other than one made by a person who testifies subject to cross-
examination at the current trial or hearing"?
47 Emphasis added.
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Rule 801(d)(1) and the accompanying commentary by the Advi-
sory Committee that drafted the Federal Rules give an intriguing
indication of the complexity and difficulty of this question. Rule
801(d)(1) leaves the traditional doctrine standing, but modifies it
by withdrawing from the definition of hearsay a statement that was
made previously by a witness who is subject to cross-examination
at the current trial or hearing and that satisfies one of three sets
of conditions: The statement (a) was made under certain restrictive
conditions and is inconsistent with the witness's current testimony,
(b) is consistent with the current testimony, and the opponent of
the evidence has opened the door by suggesting "recent fabrication
or improper influence or motive," or (c) is "one of identification
of a person made after perceiving the person."
The Advisory Committee Note, however, does not help to ex-
plain why the Rules failed to create a broader rule classifying as
nonhearsay all prior statements of a witness now subject to cross-
examination. Although the Note presents arguments against main-
taining hearsay treatment for such statements, the only consider-
ation presented by the Committee in favor of hearsay treatment is
its "unwillingness to countenance the general use of prior prepared
statements as substantive evidence." But, though a rule against
"prior prepared statements" easily could have been drafted,48 the
Committee did not propose such a Rule, nor did Congress enact
one. 49 Moreover, the Committee confused matters by saying, "If
41 Something like this might have done reasonably well:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay.-A statement is not hearsay if
(1) Piior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and
is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, unless the statement
was prepared (A) for the declarant by another person, or (3) in anticipation of
litigation.
19 On the one hand, some prepared statements are exempted by the Rule. There is noth-
ing in subdivisions (B) or (C) preventing them from applying to prepared statements. Subdi-
vision (A), relating to prior inconsistent statements, does not, at least for the most part,
cover prepared statements, because it applies only to statements made in a "proceeding"
or deposition; this limitation was not included in the rule as proposed by the Advisory
Committee, however.
On the other hand, many prior statements that are not prepared fall outside the Rule:
(1) Only statements falling within one of the three subdivisions are exempt. (As originally
enacted, the Rule only had two subdivisions; subdivision (C), for statements of identifica-
tion, was removed from the draft presented to Congress, but added back in by subsequent
legislation.)
(2) Prior inconsistent statements, even though not prepared, do not satisfy the exemption
under the Rule as enacted unless they were given both "under oath subject to the penalty
of perjury" and "at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition."
[1995
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the witness admits on the stand that he made the statement and
that it was true, he adopts the statement and there is no hearsay
problem."5 This pronouncement conflicts with traditional law5'
and with the text of Rule 801(d)(1) itself, which contains no such
provision.52
Despite the decades-long trend against the traditional rule, prior
statements made by a witness often do present serious concerns
of the type generally associated with the rule against hearsay.
These include the inability of the jury to observe the witness's
demeanor in making the statement in question s3 and, in most cases,
(3) Prior consistent statements do not satisfy the exemption unless the opponent has
opened the door by raising a charge of fabrication or improper influence or motive.
5 Notes to Rule 801(d).
51 See Goings v United States, 377 F2d 753, 761 (8th Cir 1967) (with respect to a statement
supposedly used to refresh the witness's recollection and adopted by him: "even if the
witness adopts the prior statement . . . [i]t is still a hearsay statement suggested to the
witness rather than his own statement given under oath in court").
11 That the witness adopts the prior statement does not in itself appear to make the
statement exempt under Rule 801(d)(1) from the rule against hearsay. The prior statement
may be admissible to give content to the current testimony, but that is a different matter:
A jury adhering to this distinction (which is not necessarily a sensible one) could properly
rely on the witness's memory as of the time of the testimony, but not the fresher memory
as of the time of the statement.
53 Learned Hand, in a passage quoted approvingly by McCormick and paraphrased ap-
provingly by the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence, said:
If, from all that the jury see of the witness, they conclude that what he says now
is not the truth, but what he said before, they are none the less deciding from
what they see and hear of that person and in court. There is no mythical necessity
that the case must be decided only in accordance with the truth of words uttered
under oath in court.
DiCarlo v United States, 6 F2d 364, 368 (2d Cir 1925), quoted in John William Strong,
gen ed, 2 McCormick on Evidence § 251, at 118 (West, 4th ed 1992), and paraphrased in
Adv Corn Note to Fed R Evid 801(d)(1).
But this argument fails. To the extent that demeanor is important, see generally Olin
Guy Wellborn I, Demeanor, 76 Cornell L Rev 1075 (1991) (arguing that the value of
demeanor evidence is far less than usually thought), it is the demeanor of the witness in
making the statement at issue, and in answering questions about the statement and the
events or conditions it describes, that is significant. Unless the witness was videotaped when
making the statement, the factfinder is likely to be virtually unable to assess her demeanor
in doing so.
Consider the situation addressed by Hand, in which the prosecution wishes to prove
proposition X, but a recalcitrant witness testifies to Not-X and the prosecution then offers
evidence of a prior statement made by the witness asserting X. Defendant's counsel has a
sound argument
If the witness testified falsely to X, my cross-examination might have created de-
meanor clues-sweating, eye-shifting, nail-biting-that would have been strong
indications of lying. There is no reason to suppose that the witness' truthful testi-
mony ofNot-Xwillyield similarlystrongsignals oftruthtelling-orindeed that there
are similarly strong signals. Such opportunity as I have had to bolster a friendly
witness does not replace the opportunity I need to confi-ont a hostile witness.
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the absence of an oath when the declarant made the prior state-
ment.14 But the most important of these concerns is that, if the
witness's trial testimony does not affirm the truth of all material
In another situation, which occurred in Tome, the witness testifies at trial to X and the
prior statement is of X AND Y. Plainly, the in-court testimony cannot provide demeanor
evidence with respect to Y. (If the prior statement is only of X, then the demeanor problem
may be trivial-but so too may be the probative value of the prior statement.)
Moreover, if-as the argument in this part of the article suggests is often the case-the
opponent's ability to examine the witness with respect to the prior statement and the under-
lying events or conditions is hindered, the probative value of the witness's demeanor in
responding to such examination, as well as in making the statement itself, is also plainly
diminished.
"The Advisory Committee belittled this concern:
So far as concerns the oath, [1] its mere presence has never been regarded as
sufficient to remove a statement from the hearsay category, and [2] it receives
much less emphasis than cross-examination as a truth-compelling device. While
strong expressions are found to the effect that no conviction can be had or impor-
tant right taken away on the basis of statements not made under fear of prosecu-
tion for perjury, Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 65 S.Ct. 1443, 89 L.Ed. 21103
(1945), [3] the fact is that, of the many common-law exceptions to the hearsay
rule, only that for reported testimony has required the statement to have been
made under oath.
The assertions I have labeled [1], [2], and [3] are each true, but none of them proves
very much.
[1] Of course, the presence of the oath has never been regarded as sfficient to remove
from the hearsay category an out-of-court statement that has not been subjected to cross-
examination, but the absence of an oath is important: Modern systems still require witnesses
to take an oath or make an equivalent affirmation of obligation to testify truthfully. See,
for example, Fed R Evid 603.
[2] The oath may not be as effective as cross-examination in compelling the truth, but
there is good reason to believe that it reduces the incidence of false statement: A witness
is likely to speak more carefully, and with a greater sense of moral responsibility, if she
has "declare[d] that [she] will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a
form calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind with the
duty to do so." Fed R Evid 603. Moreover, expressions such as those in Bridges, 326 US
at 153-54 (to allow a defendant "to be convicted on unsworn testimony of witnesses ...
runs counter to the notions of fairness on which our legal system is founded"), suggest
that the value of the oath lies not only in the impact it has on the witness but also (at least
with respect to criminal prosecutions) in its very formality, in establishing an acceptable
setting for making statements with testimonial intent. The sense that accusing witnesses
are forced to take the matter of accusation with utmost seriousness may be important in
making criminal convictions acceptable; see generally Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the
Event? On J7udicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 Harv L Rev 1357 (1985) (empha-
sizing the importance of public acceptability of verdicts)-especially if the oath is perceived
to restrain false statement.
[3] A similar statement could be made with respect to cross-examination; that is, the
hearsay exemption for prior testimony is the only one that requires the declarant to have
been cross-examined. A more fruitful way of looking at the matter is this: If a statement
was made under oath and subject to a satisfactory opportunity for adverse examination, it
is exempted, as prior testimony, from the rule against hearsay if the defendant cannot testify
live at the present proceedings. See Fed R Evid 804(b)(1). All the other hearsay exemptions
address situations in which either or both of these conditions do not apply. Note also that
Rule 801(d)(1)(A), as eventually passed by Congress, does require an oath for prior inconsis-
tent statements-but does not require cross-examination.
[1995
HeinOnline  -- 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 290 1995
PRIOR STATEMENTS OF A WITNESS 291
propositions asserted in the prior statement, the opponent's ability
to cross-examine the witness with respect to those propositions is
severely hindered as compared to what it would be if the witness
had affirmed those propositions at trial. Such a hindrance is, of
course, a substantial factor in determining whether the prior state-
ment should be excluded, but it is not necessarily dispositive of
that question. I shall discuss the hindrance here, and shall address
the admissibility question briefly in Parts V and VI.
In discussing the hindrance question, and generally throughout
this article, I will focus on the situation in which both the trial
testimony of the witness and the prior statement of that witness
are offered by a criminal prosecutor."5 This is, of course, only one
setting for the introduction of prior statements, but it is the setting
of Tome, and it is one in which the hindrance problem may be
quite stark.
At the outset, it is important to emphasize that the opponent
is probably not substantially prejudiced in his ability to cross-
examine the witness if she testifies to the entire substance of her
prior statement: She can be cross-examined effectively with respect
to whatever she said before, because she is also asserting it from
the witness stand. At the same time, however, this congruence be-
tween the prior statement and the current testimony makes it
doubtful, given the testimony, that there is any need for the prior
statement. Of course, in some circumstances the timing of the
prior statement may mean that the statement has significant proba-
tive value even given the current testimony. It may be that the
prior statement was made before the emergence of some improper
influence that might have deflected the witness from the truth.
SS Thus, I am simplifying somewhat by speaking of cross-examination rather than adverse
examination, and also by assuming that the opponent of the prior statement is the opponent
of the party who put the witness on the stand.
It may be that the prior statement is offered against, rather than by, the party who called
the witness to the stand; this sometimes happens if the prior statement is inconsistent with
the current testimony. In such a case, the adverse examination would be on redirect. (Note
that often the prior inconsistent statement is introduced by the party who put the witness
on the stand because the witness's testimony has been less favorable than the prior statement
to that party.)
Also, in some cases, like Tome, the prior statement is introduced, through another witness,
after the declarant has left the stand. In such a case, under customary procedures, if the
party opponent wanted to question the declarant about the prior statement he would usually
have to recall her to the stand as his own witness. Alternatively, the party opponent might
anticipate proof of the prior statements and present them to declarant while she is still on
the stand. See text accompanying note 81.
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And it may be that at trial the witness has a substantially weaker
memory of the described event than she did when making the prior
statement.
The problems are reversed when the prior statement asserts in-
formation that the current testimony does not. This disparity in
content might arise in either of two basic ways. First, it might be
that the prior statement is materially inconsistent with the wit-
ness's trial testimony, and so presumably introduced by the prose-
cution because that testimony disappointed it. Second, as in Tome,
the trial testimony may be consistent in material respects with the
prior statement, but less complete. s6 Whichever way it arises, the
disparity in content makes it likely that the prior statement has
significant probative value, even given the current testimony. But
the same disparity may significantly hinder the opponent's ability
to cross-examine.
This last suggestion seems to be in accordance with a declar-
ation made by the Supreme Court thirty years ago, in Douglas v
Alabama, that "effective confrontation" of a witness "was possible
only if [the witness] affirmed the statement as his. '5' But it also
conflicts squarely with the line taken by the Advisory Committee
for the Federal Rules58 and, consistently over the last quarter
century, by the Court as well. In California v Green, 9 the Court
held that a criminal defendant's opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant of a statement is not rendered constitutionally
inadequate by the fact that the declarant testifies at trial inconsis-
tently with the prior statement. 6' The next year, in Nelson v
O'Neil,61 the Court went further, running over Douglas by holding
s A.T.'s prior statements included a wealth of information that was not conveyed by her
trial testimony, which, for all the questions it took to secure, was rather skimpy in describing
the alleged assault. Her prior statements, but not her trial testimony, included assertions
(among others) that Tome's sexual assaults were repeated, and that he had kissed her all
over, including her vaginal area, put his fingers in her vagina, touched her breasts and her
bottom, asked her to touch his penis, and dragged her around the house.
57 380 US 415, 420 (1965). Douglas also said that the declarant "could not be cross-
examined on a statement imputed to but not admitted by him." 380 US at 419.
18 "Nor is it satisfactorily explained why cross-examination cannot be conducted subse-
quently with success." Note to Rule 801(d)(1). The Advisory Committee's view is analyzed
further in notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
59 399 US 149 (1970).
" This was the holding of Green, even if it did not represent the actual facts of the case.
The Court analyzed the case as if the witness testified inconsistently with the prior state-
[1995
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that there was no constitutional problem, though the declarant not
only testified inconsistently with the prior statement, but denied
making it.62 And seventeen years after Nelson, in United States v
Owens,63 the Court extended Green in another direction, holding
that, under both the Confrontation Clause and Rule 801(d)(1), the
opportunity to cross-examine is not rendered inadequate by the
fact that at trial the witness no longer remembers the event de-
scribed in the prior statement.
In effect, Green, Nelson, and Owens all concluded that cross-
examination with respect to the prior statement was not only ade-
quate, but hardly necessary. In the Court's view, because at trial
the witness no longer asserts a proposition that she asserted in the
prior statement, the opponent has essentially achieved the benefit
of cross-examination with respect to that proposition.64
ment, and held that this did not render cross-examination constitutionally deficient. 399
US at 153-64. Only toward the end of the case did the Court seem to notice that in fact
the witness claimed a failure of memory "and hence failed to give any current version of
the more important events described in his earlier statement." Id at 168. The Court recog-
nized that this factor raised an additional issue, and so remanded the case, id at 168-70;
that issue was resolved in the Owens case, described below.
61402 US 622 (1971).
61 Nelson distinguished Douglas on the ground that, in Douglas, the declarant refused on
the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination to answer any substantive questions.
In Nelson, defense counsel did not cross-examine the declarant at all. Contrary to the
Court's implication, however, this does not suggest that the declarant's testimony left the
defendant in a strong position; he was, after all, convicted. Rather, defense counsel presum-
ably concluded that cross-examination of a witness who had just provided favorable testi-
mony was unlikely to do much good.
- 484 US 554 (1988).
6 In Green, 399 US at 159, the Court said:
The most successful cross-examination at the time the prior statement was made
could hardly hope to accomplish more than has already been accomplished by the
fact that the witness is now telling a different, inconsistent story, and-in this
case-one that is favorable to the defendant.
In Nelson, 402 US at 628-29, the Court said:
Had Runnels in this case "affirmed the statement as his," the respondent would
certainly have been in far worse straits than those in which he found himself when
Runnels testified as he did....
The short of the matter is that, given a joint trial and a common defense, Run-
nels's testimony respecting his alleged out-of-court statement was more favorable
to the respondent than any that cross-examination by counsel could possibly have
produced, had Runnels "affirmed the statement as his."
And in Owens, 484 US at 561-62, the Court said:
[L]imitations on the scope of examination by the trial court or assertions of privi-
lege by the witness may undermine the process to such a degree that meaningful
cross-examination within the intent of the Rule no longer exists. But that effect
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For several reasons, I believe this analysis is misguided.
1. Blunting the Tools. Suppose the prosecution wishes to prove
that the defendant, Dennis, was at a particular restaurant, The
Scene, on a given night. If a witness, Whitney, testifies on direct
examination, asserting proposition DENSCENE (that Dennis was
at The Scene on the night in question) purportedly from her cur-
rent memory, Dennis has an uncluttered opportunity to confront
her. Through counsel, he might ask her questions that appear to
have some relation to DENSCENE. For example, he might ask
her whether GAILSCENE-the proposition that Gail, Dennis's
girlfriend, was at The Scene at the same time-is true. If the wit-
ness does not in fact have a clear memory that DENSCENE is
true, but she is eager to have the jury believe that it is, this question
might put her in an awkward position. For all she knows, if she
affirms GAILSCENE, Dennis might be able to show that GAIL-
SCENE is false-perhaps there is a solid alibi for Gail-suggest-
ing that the same testimonial failure that led to Whtney's inaccu-
rate assertion of GAILSCENE might have led to her assertion of
DENSCENE. And for all Whitney knows, if she denies GAIL-
SCENE, Dennis might be able to demonstrate that it is highly
unlikely that if DENSCENE is true GATLSCENE is false; per-
haps Dennis and Gail are known to have been together earlier and
later that night, and it seems highly implausible that Dennis would
have dropped Gail off before going to The Scene and picked
her up later. Finally, if she attempts to avoid the dilemma by deny-
ing ability to remember whether or not GAILSCENE is true,
it might be that Dennis can demonstrate that it is highly unlikely
that she would remember DENSCENE and not remember GAIL-
SCENE; perhaps Gail was wearing a bright red dress, she and
Whitney were good friends, and Dennis's presence at The Scene
would likely have appeared utterly unremarkable to Whitney at
the time, but Gail's presence was unusual.
Of course, Whitney might guess right when asked, "Was Gail
there with Dennis?" She might assert what is in fact true, or at
least what Dennis cannot effectively disprove. But Dennis has at
least had the opportunity to lay the trap. If he lays enough of them,
is not produced by the witness' assertion of memory loss-which... is often the
very result sought to be produced by cross-examination, and can be effective in
destroying the force of the prior statement.
[1995
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and Gail is not testifying truthfully in asserting her clear memory
of DENSCENE, she is likely to fall into one of them.
The predicate for all this, though, is that Whitney asserts
DENSCENE just before cross-examination. If Whitney denies
DENSCENE on direct examination but her prior assertion
of DENSCENE is admitted, cross-examination is unlikely to
have the same effectiveness. Suppose the defense asks Whitney
whether GAILSCENE is true and she denies it. Now, even
if NOT-GAILSCENE, or the conjunctive proposition DEN-
SCENE AND NOT-GAILSCENE, appears highly unlikely, the
prosecution has a ready explanation-that the same testimonial
failure that led to an inaccurate denial of GAILSCENE on cross
led to an inaccurate denial of DENSCENE on direct. Similarly,
if Whitney's prior statement of DENSCENE is admitted after she
testifies on direct that she cannot remember whether or not DEN-
SCENE is true, her testimony on cross that she cannot remember
whether or not GAILSCENE is true will help Dennis little or not
at all. If it does not already appear strange that Whitney remem-
bered DENSCENE at the time of the earlier statement but not
at trial, it will probably not appear strange that she does not re-
member GAILSCENE at trial. The prosecution is not put in the
position of arguing that Whitney remembered the more forgetta-
ble and forgot the more memorable; a single "gauzy cloak" of for-
getfulness 65 over the whole matter will provide a full explanation.
2. Denial of the Possibility of Complete Nullification. When a wit-
ness testifies on direct to ASSERTION, the best result the cross-
examiner can hope to achieve is a repudiation of the direct testi-
mony-a statement by the witness saying, in effect, "Although I
just testified to ASSERTION on direct, I recognize now that I
cannot affirm that it is true." This might occur if the witness fol-
lows along with the type of examination outlined above: "Gee, I
have no idea whether or not CONSEQUENTIAL DETAIL is
true, and I guess that if ASSERTION were true then I would
know that CONSEQUENTIAL DETAIL is true, so I suppose I
was mistaken in asserting ASSERTION." Nearly thirty years ago,
in an extremely perceptive opinion in Ruhala v Roby,6 6 the Supreme
65 California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 US 97, 106 (1980)
("a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing ar-
rangement").
- 379 Mich 102, 124-28, 150 NV 2d 146, 156-58 (1967).
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Court of Michigan showed how cross-examination might lead to
this result. When this happens, as the Ruhala court pointed out,
the witness's direct testimony of ASSERTION retains little proba-
tive value; it would almost certainly be struck and not allowed to
support a verdict, at least if the witness did not again affirm AS-
SERTION on redirect.67 Presumably the same result would obtain
if the witness were allowed to testify on direct by adopting a prior
statement in all its details, and then on cross repudiated it all: The
recantation on cross of everything the witness had said on direct
would mean that the "original recanted version no longer stands
as substantive evidence."
But now suppose the starting point of the examination is that,
although the witness once said ASSERTION, she says so no
longer. The proponent will argue that the witness accurately stated
ASSERTION at the earlier time and that some influence-failure
of memory, perhaps, or bias-intervened to prevent her from stat-
ing ASSERTION at trial. If that argument is plausible, the prior
statement retains probative value with respect to ASSERTION.
And if for this reason the prior statement is admitted to prove
ASSERTION, that means by definition that the opponent cannot
hope to achieve the optimal result, nullification of a statement just
made. "If I had been able to cross-examine immediately after the
witness stated ASSERTION," the opponent can argue, "I might
have secured a complete retraction that would have nullified the
effectiveness of the current testimony. I can't do that now."
Rather, the admissibility of the prior statement means that the jury
is told, in effect, "You have two different versions before you, the
prior statement and the current testimony. Consider them both
and draw the best inference you can."68
Perhaps the lost opportunity to the cross-examiner seems trivial,
the mere denial of a faint possibility of a "final triumphal flourish"
67
When a cross-examiner on timely cross-examination succeeds in getting the witness
to change his story, the integrity of the recantation is apparent, and his original,
recanted vesion no longer stands as substantive evidence. If the only evidence of an
essential fact in a lawsuit were a statement made from the witness stand which
the witness himself completely recanted and repudiated before he left the witness
stand, no one would seriously urge that a jury question had been made out.
379 Mich at 128, 150 NW2d at 158.
" The substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements was defended by McCor-
mick on just this ground. Charles T. McCormick, Evidence § 39, at 75 (West 1954).
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at the conclusion of cross-examination."9 It is true, of course, that
most witnesses do not make full recantations of assertions they
have just made on direct. But the fact is that the witness has testi-
fied in a way at variance with the prior statement, failing to assert
a proposition asserted in the prior statement; if the witness had
made the assertion in direct testimony, and then disclaimed it on
cross, the assertion would have been nullified.
3. A Buffer Around the Statement. The time gap between the
prior statement and the trial testimony may provide a ready expla-
nation for why the witness does not testify at trial to the substance
of the statement. The witness may, for example, have suffered a
memory loss because of trauma" or because of the more ordinary
passage of time, she may have been intimidated into silence, or
she may have been exposed to some bias-creating motive.7 But
showing such intervening influences is not generally to the advan-
tage of the party opposing the proposition asserted in the prior
statement.
To the contrary, it may be the proponent who wants to demon-
strate these intervening influences.72 If they tend to lead the declar-
ant away from, rather than toward, the truth, they generally will
tend to make more probable an account in which the events oc-
curred as the proponent contends, the initial statement accurately
reported the events, and then a testimonial failure occurred that
prevented the witness from recounting the full substance of the
earlier statement at trial.73
69 Letter of Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and Advisory Com-
mittee on Rules of Evidence to Sen. James 0. Eastland, Chairman of Senate Committee
on theJudiciary, May 22, 1974, quoted in Jack B. Weinstein, Margaret A. Berger, & Joseph
M. McLaughlin, 4 Weinstein's Evidence 801-15 (Matthew Bender, 1995) (hereinafter "Joint
Committee letter").
0 That was quite clearly the situation in Owens, in which one Foster, the victim of the
vicious battering with which Owens was charged, was unable at trial to identify his assailant,
though he had previously made a statement identifying Owens.
11 All these, except perhaps the last, are possible explanations of A.T.'s failure at trial to
repeat the full substance of her earlier statements.
11 It is thus laughable to think, as the Court suggested, that Owens "destroy[ed] the force"
of Foster's statement by showing Foster's memory loss, or that he achieved "the very result
sought to be produced" in his cross-examination of Foster, 484 US at 562; Owens was,
after all, convicted largely on the basis of the statement.
7 Thus, McCormick on Evidence, § 251, in a passage that originated with the second edition
(Edward Cleary, gen ed, West, 1972), comments with respect to State v Saporen, 205 Minn
358, 285 NW 898 (1939), a case often cited in favor of the traditional view that prior
statements of a witness are hearsay, that
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Consider Tome itself. A.T. seemed to acknowledge at one point
during her testimony that she made some of the prior statements,
but the prosecutor did not ask her to affirm their truth to the
extent that they went beyond her in-court testimony.14 It seems
unlikely that Tome would have been able effectively to cross-
examine A.T. with respect to her prior statements.75 Tome might,
of course, be able to explore her lack of memory at the time of
trial and her inability to testify articulately at trial. But this would
not suggest that her previous articulations of sexual abuse, made
in different circumstances a substantial time before, were concoc-
tions of failed memory. Indeed, the decay of memory in the period
leading up to trial, which Tome could easily demonstrate, has no
obvious bearing on what he would want to show-that in the period
leading up to the statements A.T., whether consciously or not, fabri-
cated recollections. Rather, emphasizing A.T.'s inability to testify
fully at trial would simply play into the prosecution's hands, given
that the prior statements included information helpful to the pros-
ecution and not affirmed by her trial testimony: It would make
more likely a scenario in which the events occurred, she made the
the witness did change his story very substantially; rather than hardening, his testi-
mony yielded to something between the giving of the statement and the time of
testifying. This appears to be so in a very high proportion of the cases, and the
circumstances most frequently suggest that the "something" which caused the
change was an improper influence.
This is not really an argument that cross-examination of the declarant is adequate, or
that the statement should not be considered hearsay. Rather, it is an argument that in the
run of cases the prior statement should be deemed reliable. But surely this is too broad a
generalization to support wholesale exemption of all prior statements from examination
under the law of hearsay, especially when confrontation rights are at stake.
Indeed, in Saporen itself, the circumstances did not suggest that an improper influence
had arisen between the time of the statement and the time of the testimony; on the contrary,
the witness contended that he had made the prior statement, which was more favorable to
the prosecution than was his current testimony, in response to threats. 205 Minn at 360,
285 NW at 900.
Interestingly, then, the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence, while
defending a doctrine similar to that espoused by McCormick, took a far different approach
to cases like Saporen. See notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
7 4T 158-59.
7 Note that Rule 801(d)(1) requires that the witness be "subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement," not " . . . concerning the subject matter of the statement." It
would be possible to construe the two formulations so that the second one, but not the
first, demands that the witness remember the subject matter of the statement, not merely
the statement itself. On the other hand, arguably the first formulation but not the second
demands that the opponent have an opportunity to examine the witness after the prior
statement has been presented to the jury.
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statements accurately describing them, and subsequently forgot
them or became intimidated.
Sometimes at trial (not in Tome), the witness not only fails to
confirm the entirety of the prior statement, but repudiates it and
supplies a reason for making the statement notwithstanding its in-
accuracy.76 The drafters of the Federal Rules, arguing unsuccess-
fully in favor of a general exemption for prior inconsistent state-
ments, contended that this result "is cross-examination beyond the
dreams of avarice."" But that is plainly not so-as demonstrated
by the convictions achieved in notable cases by prosecutors re-
lying on prior accusatory statements repudiated from the witness
stand by the accusers.78 Indeed, this argument exposes a certain
Janus-like quality in the arguments for the adequacy of later cross-
examination. Is the point, as the drafters and the Supreme Court
have contended, that the inconsistent testimony itself satisfies the
need for cross-examination by exposing the weakness of the prior
statement? Or is it the contrary point, advocated by the editors
of McCormick on Evidence, that the prior statement is too valuable
to lose because the inconsistency is likely attributable to a later-
arising improper influence?"
Certainly the facts might appear to fit the McCormick por-
trayal-but this is not necessarily an argument for admissibility.
The jury may be persuaded that the prior accusatory statement
was the true one, and that the improper influence was brought to
bear by the accused between the time of the prior statement and
the time of trial, leading the witness not only to retract the prior
statement but to concoct an explanation as to why she made that
statement. Adverse examination of the witness at the time of trial,
when she is making and explaining the repudiation, will plainly be
of little avail in dispelling such a conclusion. The situation is much
76 For example, in Saporen, the witness said that he had made the earlier statement in
response to threats. In another such case, People v Johnson, 68 Cal 2d 646, 68 Cal Rptr
599, 441 P2d 111 (1968), rejected in California v Green, 399 US 149 (1970), the witnesses,
the wife and daughter of the defendant, contended that previous personal interests of theirs
had led them to accuse him falsely of sexual molestation. The Advisory Committee said
that these cases, which argued for the inadequacy of the later cross-examination, "in fact
demonstrate quite thorough exploration of the weaknesses and doubts attending the earlier
statement." Note to Rule 801(d)(1).
71Joint Committee letter, cited in note 69.
7' See Saporen and Johnson, discussed in note 76.
'9 See note 73.
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as if there were two witnesses. One is in court, subject to examina-
tion, casting doubt on the prior statement, and so outwardly help-
ing the accused, but in a suspicious manner wholly unpersuasive
to the factfinder. The other, the one doing the damage, is not in
court and is impervious to adverse examination."
Put another way, cross-examination in this circumstance is
somewhat like pushing on a string; the task cannot be done most
effectively unless it meets resistance.
4. Enhanced Cost and Risk. Tome illustrates an additional obstacle
that some opponents confront. Had A.T. testified on direct to the
substance of the prior statements, then presumably Tome's coun-
sel would not have foregone the opportunity in the course of her
cross-examination, which followed immediately, to question A.T.
about those assertions. But this was not the situation. A.T.'s prior
statements were introduced through other witnesses after A.T. had
left the stand; she herself gave conflicting and sometimes ambigu-
ous testimony, on cross and redirect examination, as to whether
she had even made the statements or remembered doing so.81
Thus, to examine A.T. about the substance of the prior statements,
which added considerable detail not in her testimony, counsel
would have had to present those details to her. This she could
have done in either of two basic ways. First, while A.T. was on
the stand as the prosecution's witness, counsel could have antici-
pated the testimony of the other witnesses, reciting its substance
to her-a move that would have been utterly self-defeating if
"
5As the Rubala court suggested, the fact that the witness is no longer asserting the
proposition at issue may force the opponent to treat her as more friendly than hostile.
("The would-be cross-examiner . . . is left with no choice but to become the witness's
friend, protector and savior." 379 Mich at 125, 150 NW2d at 156.) And this means that
"the real nature of cross-examination" is lost:
Cross-examination presupposes a witness who affirms a thing being examined by
a lawyer who would have him deny it, or a witness who denies a thing being
examined by a lawyer who would have him affirm it. Cross-examination is in its
essence an adversary proceeding. The extent to which the cross-examiner is able
to shake the witness, or induce him to equivocate is the very measure of the cross-
examiner's success.
*** If [the witness] refuses to adopt his prior statement as true, there can be
no adversary cross-examination upon it. If he refuses to affirm, no question can
be put to him which would shake his own confidence in his affirmation.
379 Mich at 124, 150 NW2d at 156.
" T 152-53, 158-59.
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Tome still hoped to keep any of that testimony away from the
jury. Alternatively, counsel might have recalled A.T. to the stand
after the other witnesses testified-a move that the jury might have
regarded as desperate and overbearing-and reviewed that testi-
mony. Either way, counsel would have had to give the prosecu-
tion's most vivid evidence an extra run-through in front of the
jury. And if her examination of A.T. on these details fell flat, a
very predictable prospect given A.T.'s performance on the stand,
Tome would probably end up worse off than if she had never tried:
The jury would likely have seen that, by presenting A.T. with the
prior statements, counsel was going out of her way to dig her own
hole, and failure to dig herself out might have been particularly
damaging.
Not surprisingly, defense counsel, presumably reckoning that
the risk outweighed the potential benefit, did not attempt to pur-
sue the matter.
I do not mean to suggest that introduction of a prior statement
made by a witness who no longer asserts all its substance necessar-
ily leaves the party opponent in a helpless position; he is presum-
ably better off than if a credible witness tells a convincing story
that is impervious to cross-examination. Nor do I suggest that
prior statements in this circumstance ought generally to be ex-
cluded; whether exclusion is appropriate does not depend exclu-
sively on whether the opportunity for cross-examination is satisfac-
tory. But what I have tried to show is that the opportunity for
cross-examination is substantially hindered in this situation-and
that the Supreme Court has failed since Green to recognize this.
The natural response to this problem, under the prevailing
structure of the law, is to classify such prior statements as hearsay.
Within that structure, the traditional classification of prior state-
ments as hearsay makes more sense than was recognized by the
Advisory Committee, which in large part retained it, or by the
Supreme Court, which even in the extreme circumstances of Owens
refused to recognize how the opportunity for effective cross-
examination was hindered. But placing a statement within the basic
definition of hearsay in Rule 801(c) is only the first step in de-
termining whether it is excluded by the Rules as hearsay. I now
turn to the exemption at issue in Tome.
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III. UNDERSTANDING THE RULE ON PRIOR "CONSISTENT"
STATEMENTS
Rule 801(d)(1)(B) exempts from the rule against hearsay a
prior statement by a declarant who is a witness at the trial or hear-
ing, subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, if the
statement is "consistent with the declarant's testimony and is of-
fered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant
of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive." The struc-
ture of the Rule has proved confusing. In two respects, thinking
about it might be simplified by replacing the first eight words in
this quotation by the word "admissible."
First, this change emphasizes the essential nature of the rule,
which some judges have misunderstood: If a prior statement is ad-
missible on the limited ground stated in the Rule ("to rebut an
express or implied charge . . ."), then the rule against hearsay
should not bar admission of the statement to prove the truth of
a matter that it asserts.82
Second, consistency is a misleading standard. If a statement is
admissible for the described rebuttal purpose, then it should be
deemed consistent within the meaning of the Rule." The prior
"
2The Advisory Committee Note stated this point rather clumsily: "Prior consistent
statements traditionally have been admissible to rebut charges of recent fabrication or im-
proper influence or motive but not as substantive evidence. Under the rule they are substan-
tive evidence." Adv Comm Note to Rule 801(d)(1)(B). But not all prior consistent state-
ments are substantive evidence under the Rule, just as not all were traditionally admissible
for rebuttal purposes.
Some courts have been confused by the structure of the Rule because it appears to address
only a nonhearsay use of the prior statement. See, for example, United States v Casoni, 950
F2d 893, 905 (3d Cir 1991) (stating that "the rule is confusing" because if a statement is
offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication "it is then not offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted"). But placement of the Rule within the definition of hearsay seems
to make clear the framers' intention that if the prior statement is offered (or, in my view,
admissible) for the designated nonhearsay purpose, then the Rule also makes it exempt
from the rule against hearsay.
"3 Of course, mere logical consistency-that is, the absence of logical inconsistency-is
insufficient to invoke the rule. The statements "My father abused me" and "It is raining
today" are perfectly consistent, but the fact that the witness asserted one of them does not
suggest that she was telling the truth in asserting the other.
In State v Collins, 1989 Ohio App LEXIS 452, the court did attempt to find independent
meaning for the word "consistent" as used in Ohio Rule 801(d)(1)(B), which is identical
to the federal rule. Purporting to rely on a dictionary search, the court concluded that "the
concept of agreement" is the central core of the word's meaning in the rule, so that "state-
ments to be consistent must be about the same subject matter" and "statements concerning
two differing subjects [such as, presumably, the abuse and rain statements presented just
above] are simply foreign to each other." But the court also said, after pointing out that
the prior statement in that case included matter foreign to the testimony, "Since the concept
[1995
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statement may have the prescribed rebuttal effect if it contains pre-
cisely the same information as the current testimony, somewhat
more (as in Tome) or less, or even if there are logical inconsistenc-
ies between the two.84
As emphasized by Justice Breyer's dissent, rebutting a "charge
of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive" is not the
only way in which a prior consistent statement may tend to reha-
bilitate a witness's testimonyY Why, then, was it the only form
of rehabilitation mentioned by Rule 801(d)(1)(B)? Justice Breyer's
attempt to develop a rationale is unpersuasive.86 The most plausible
explanation appears to be that this was just a careless bit of draft-
ing. The intention of the drafters seems to have been that if a
of a prior consistent statement is primarily directed to rehabilitation of a witness charged
with having fabricated his testimony, the testimony [of the prior statement] as admitted
could not satisfy this purpose."
4 United States v Casoni, 950 F2d 893, 896, 903 (3d Cir 1991) (holding that prior state-
ments of witness "fall within Rule 801(d)(1)(B)'s definition of prior consistent statements
because the rule does not require them to be consistent in every detail with [the witness's]
testimony at trial"; the prior statements and the current testimony were indeed inconsistent
in some details); United States v Vest, 842 F2d 1319, 1329 (1st Cir 1988) (holding prior
statement "sufficiently dose" to the testimony to be covered by the Rule, notwithstanding
"the one inconsistency"; "a prior consistent statement need not be identical in every detail
to the declarant's ... testimony at trial").
Suppose Alfred testifies against Brenda, describing some wrongdoing that he says she
committed. Brenda brings out that a year before trial Alfred developed a terrible grudge
against Brenda when Brenda divorced Alfred's brother. Alfred or Charles might then testify
against Brenda that several years before that, while family serenity reigned, Alfred had made
a casual statement to Charles describing the wrongdoing; admissibility of the statement on
this basis will not ordinarily be defeated on the ground that in the prior statement Alfred
said the deed occurred on June 23 and in the current testimony he placed it on June 24.
15 115 S Ct at 707. Perhaps most importantly, a prior statement that reflects a significantly
fresher memory than does the current testimony might help dispel the contention that the
testimony is a product of faulty memory. The logic here is much the same as in the case
of a premotive statement offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication: A statement made
before the alleged testimonial failure suggests strongly that the failure does not account
for the testimony. Indeed, perhaps "fabrication" could be construed to reach the case of
false testimony created by faulty memory-but that would be a stretch.
8 He suggested that (1) jurors have trouble distinguishing between substantive and reha-
bilitative use of the type of statement covered by the Rule, (2) the Rule was a concession
to this difficulty, and (3) "[i]f there was a reason why the drafters excluded from Rule
801(d)(1)(B)'s scope other kinds of prior consistent statements (used for rehabilitation), per-
haps it was that the drafters concluded that those other statements caused jury confusion
to a lesser degree." 115 S Ct at 707-08. The first proposition is unquestionably correct,
but the third is, as Justice Breyer seemed to recognize, totally speculative; he suggested no
reason to believe that it is true, and I doubt that there is. (The second proposition may
be descriptively accurate, but as I show later in this part there are considerations not depen-
dent on the effectiveness of a jury instruction that weigh in favor, within the prevailing
structure of hearsay law, of maintaining the distinction between substantive and rehabilita-
tive use.)
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prior consistent statement is admissible for rehabilitation it should
be admissible substantively-that is, to prove the truth of what it
asserts-notwithstanding the rule against hearsay. The language
used by the Rule describes the most common, but not the exclusive,
situation in which a prior consistent statement might be admitted
for rehabilitation.
Of course, this language, however careless, does limit the reach
of the Rule. Only statements described by the Rule are exempted
by it from the rule against hearsay. But the Rule should not be
understood to state the bounds of the circumstances in which a
prior statement consistent with a witness's testimony is admissible
to support the credibility of the witness. The Rule would be oddly
placed to set the bounds on rehabilitative use. It is in the Article
dealing with the law of hearsay, and is expressly part of the defini-
tion of hearsay, not in the Article that deals with impeachment
and support of witnesses. Moreover, it is clearly a rule designed
to loosen an old restraint on admissibility, not to impose one. Un-
fortunately, some courts have interpreted the Rule to set the
bounds of admissibility of prior consistent statements for rehabili-
tative as well as substantive purposes.87 The issue was not posed
by Tome, but some loose language in the majority opinion might
suggest-unintentionally, I believe-that this was the Court's
view.88
Why should, or should not, a prior consistent statement admis-
sible for the rebuttal purpose described by the Rule (or for any
other rebuttal purpose) also be admissible substantively-that is,
to prove the truth of what it asserts? To ask this question brings
into relief another perplexing question: What (if anything) is the
17 See John William Strong, gen ed, 2 McComiick on Evidence § 251 nn 29-30 and accom-
panying text (West, 4th ed 1992) (collecting authorities going both ways).
11 The Court seems to have spoken of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) as a rule of rebuttal testimony.
See 115 S Ct at 702 ("if the drafters of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) intended to countenance rebuttal
along that indirect inferential chain"), 705 ("The Rule permits the introduction of a declar-
ant's out-of-court statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence
or motive only when . . ."). On the other hand, the latter statement is prefaced by this
statement: "Our holding is confined to the requirements for admission under Rule
801(d)(1)(B)." The Court's view seems to have been that the Rule implicitly (via the premo-
tive requirement) limits the circumstances in which a prior statement might be admitted
for the rebuttal purpose specified by the Rule itself, but not for other rebuttal purposes.
Compare 115 S Ct at 707 (Breyer, J, dissenting: "The majority is correct in saying that
there are different kinds of categories of prior consistent statements that can rehabilitate
a witness in different ways .... ").
[1995
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difference between the two grounds of admissibility? I think the
best answers to these questions, like the issue of the adequacy of
cross-examination, depend very much on whether the prior state-
ment introduces information not contained in the current tes-
timony.
Consider first the situation in which the prior statement merely
asserted a proposition, ACCUSATION, that is contained in the
current testimony; according to the party opponent, some im-
proper influence caused the witness to testify to ACCUSATION,
but the prior statement, having been made (to keep matters simple)
before the influence arose, suggests that this is not so. Even in this
situation, there is an epistemological difference between admissi-
bility of the prior statement only to rebut the charge of improper
influence, on the one hand, and to prove the truth of the matter
that the statement asserts, on the other-but it is a narrow and
rather rickety one. Consider three mutually exclusive and exhaus-
tive propositions:
(1) Absent the intervention of the improper influence, the wit-
ness would not have testified to ACCUSATION at trial.
(2) At the time of the prior statement, the witness believed
ACCUSATION to be true [which makes ACCUSATION
more likely true], and even absent the intervention of the im-
proper influence she would have testified to ACCUSATION
at trial.
(3) At the time of the prior statement, the witness did not be-
lieve ACCUSATION to be true [which makes ACCUSA-
TION less likely true], but even absent the intervention of the
improper influence she would have testified to ACCUSATION
at trial.
Admissibility only for the rebuttal purpose can be taken to mean
that the jurors can use the prior statement to evaluate the probabil-
ity of proposition (1) against propositions (2) and (3),89 but not to
evaluate the probability of proposition (2) against proposition (3).
19 Even though the statement was made before the improper influence arose, it does not
prove absolutely that the witness would have testified to ACCUSATION at the time of
trial absent the influence. It could be that at the time of the statement the witness was
subject to some other influence, not as strongly active at the time of trial, tending to lead her
to state ACCUSATION. It could be, for example, that the witness states ACCUSATION at
the earlier time, believing (whether accurately or not) that ACCUSATION is true, but by
the time of trial has no recollection of ACCUSATION, and absent the improper influence
would not testify as to it.
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That this difference is logically coherent is perhaps the best that
can be said for it. Even assuming a jury-or a court-can under-
stand the distinction, adherence to it is improbable; neither is
likely to cramp its reasoning so artificially.9"
Perhaps more important, no good purpose is served by such a
restriction. Recall from the last section that, if the substance of
the prior statement is included in the current testimony, the party
opponent is not genuinely hindered in cross-examination by the
fact that the prior statement was made some time before the cur-
rent testimony. If the prior statement is nevertheless to be ex-
cluded, the only sound reasons would be to induce the presentation
of the witness's current testimony and, in light of that testimony,
to avoid wasting time by presentation of evidence that has little
incremental value. But the witness has given her current testimony,
and even before the charge of improper influence is made the prior
statement may have significant incremental value in that it reflects
a substantially fresher memory than does the current testimony.
Once the charge is made, the question is easy: The statement will
be heard and considered by the jurors, at least for the rehabilitative
purpose, and no time is saved by putting artificial shackles on
them. Moreover, the party opponent, having suggested the inter-
vention of an improper influence, is hardly in a position to com-
plain if the jury is allowed to consider whether an earlier statement
by the witness of ACCUSATION tends to make it more probable
that the witness believed ACCUSATION when she asserted it,
and therefore also that ACCUSATION is true. As the Advisory
Committee said, "The prior statement is consistent with the testi-
mony given on the stand, and, if the opposite party wishes to open
the door for its admission in evidence, no sound reason is apparent
why it should not be received generally."91
Indeed, in this situation, it appears that the only valid purpose
'Jack B. Weinstein and Margaret A. Berger, 4 Weinstein's Evidence 1 801(d)(1)(B)[01]
(Matthew Bender, 1995), says that "as a practical matter, the jury in all probability would
misunderstand or ignore a limiting instruction anyway, so there is no good reason for giving
one."
I have two reactions to this statement. First, the problem does not reflect an inadequacy
of jurors; the distinction I have drawn is paper thin, and I suspect that many judges as well
would misunderstand and ignore it.
Second, as suggested below, limiting admissibility may be justified even assuming that a
limiting instruction would not be effective.
1 Note to Rule 801(d)(1)(B).
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served by the distinction between rebuttal admissibility and sub-
stantive admissibility is a door-keeping one. That is, assuming that
the statement is inadmissible before the charge of improper influ-
ence is made, the making of the charge opens the door to rebuttal
admissibility, and so too a path that leads to substantive admissibil-
ity. In this setting, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) reflects a sound judgment that
the rule against hearsay ought not place any restriction on the use
of the statement.
Now suppose that, while the current testimony is of GENERAL
ACCUSATION, the prior statement asserted GENERAL AC-
CUSATION AND DETAIL. In this setting, which resembles the
one in Tome, there is what I will refer to as an overhang-the
prior statement includes the proposition at issue but is more infor-
mative than the current testimony. The overhang changes the situ-
ation fundamentally in four respects.92
First, assuming the prior statement is admissible for both rebut-
tal and substantive purposes with respect to GENERAL ACCU-
SATION, there is a clear epistemological distinction between
these uses of the statement and use with respect to DETAIL. The
instruction, "You may consider the prior statement as tending to
prove GENERAL ACCUSATION, but do not consider it with
respect to DETAIL" is simple and quite clear; there is even the
chance that the jury would obey it. It may be that the witness's
assertion of DETAIL has some value in rebutting the contention
of improper influence with respect to GENERAL ACCUSA-
TION, but even if so the distinction remains clear: "You may con-
sider the witness's prior assertion of DETAIL so far as it tends to
prove that she would have testified to GENERAL ACCUSA-
TION even had it not been for the intervention of the improper
influence, but do not consider the statement as tending to prove
that DETAIL is true."
Second, there is now a substantial consideration weighing in fa-
vor of exclusion with respect to DETAIL, even assuming the state-
ment is admitted to prove GENERAL ACCUSATION; as dis-
cussed in Part II, the fact that the witness has not testified to
DETAIL means that the party opponent may be severely hindered
in his ability to cross-examine her.
9 See generally State v Collins, 1989 Ohio App LEXIS 452 (holding that because the
prior statement contained "an addition" to the current testimony it could not be considered
a "consistent" statement within the Ohio rule, which is identical to the federal rule).
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Third, more is at stake than the manner in which the jury uses
the prior statement to prove a given proposition, and the court is
in a position to protect those stakes without having to rely on an
abstruse instruction. For example, it may be that DETAIL closely
bears on an element of a crime and that, absent admissibility of
the prior statement of DETAIL, there would be insufficient evi-
dence of that element to go to the jury. (With respect to GEN-
ERAL ACCUSATION, by contrast, there is already the witness's
testimony asserting GENERAL ACCUSATION.) Tome illustrates
this situation. With respect to two of the acts charged and found
by the jury, there would have been no substantial evidence had it
not been for the prior statements.93 As a consequence, a holding
that the prior statement is inadmissible to prove DETAIL can be
enforced by withholding that issue from the jury. The question
whether the jury would adhere to an instruction drawing barely
comprehensible distinctions is thus rendered moot.
Even if the prior statement of DETAIL would support the proof
of material issues, but is not essential to sustain a jury verdict with
respect to any of them, effective tools are at hand to ensure that
the jury does not use the statement to prove DETAIL. Sometimes
the nature of the statement allows severance, so that the proponent
is allowed to prove that the witness asserted GENERAL ACCU-
SATION but not that she asserted DETAIL. And even where sev-
erance is not possible, another form of redaction might be appro-
priate, limiting and shaping what testimony may be given about
the prior statement; in some cases, for example, the proponent's
rebuttal needs might be satisfied by testimony that on a given date
the witness made a statement indicating that she then believed
GENERAL ACCUSATION to be true.94 Furthermore, outright
93 A.T. did not testify to contact between Tome's mouth and her vulva, or between
Tome's fingers and her genitalia; the evidence supporting these findings was supplied by
the prior statements reported by Eclebarger and Kuper, respectively. See above notes 20,
23, and accompanying text; T 725 (prosecutor, in closing argument, referring to these state-
ments as supporting findings of mouth-vulva and finger-genital contact). These statements
were not necessary for the case as a whole to go to the jury, but the indictment specified
four separate types of illicit acts, special interrogatories presented to the jury asked about
the four, and the jury answered all four in the affirmative; it may be that Tome's sentence
would have been lighter absent a jury finding of mouth-vulva and finger-genital contact.
See generally 18 USC § 2246(2), formerly § 2245(2), listing the four types of conduct
charged, among others, in the definition of "sexual act."
'
4 Analogously, in rape cases most states allow the prosecution to present evidence, even
before the complainant has been impeached, that she made a "fresh complaint"-that is,
one soon after the incident-because the absence of such a complaint might appear suspi-
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exclusion is also an available option: In some circumstances, the
statement might have less value in supporting the witness's testi-
mony of GENERAL ACCUSATION than prejudicial potential in
tending to prove DETAIL through means made unsatisfactory by
the hindrance on cross-examination.
Finally, the overhang deprives the door-opening argument of
much of its force. At least where the proponent's rebuttal needs
can indeed be protected by a severed statement or limited testi-
mony about the statement, the fact that the party opponent sug-
gested that testimony of GENERAL ACCUSATION was a prod-
uct of improper influence should not give the proponent the ability
to introduce a statement, not otherwise admissible, of DETAIL.
This analysis suggests a note of caution. In some cases, the court
should ensure-by outright exclusion, severance of the statement,
limitation of the testimony, or instruction-that the jury does not
use the prior statement to prove propositions to which the witness
has not testified. Nothing in Rule 801(d)(1)(B) precludes a ruling
of limited admissibility in which the prior statement may be used
only to prove (through both rebuttal and substantive use) the prop-
ositions asserted in the witness's current testimony. The Advisory
Committee Note suggests that the drafters paid no attention to the
overhang problem; they appear to have focused on the situation in
which the witness reaffirms at trial the complete substance of the
prior statement. There is no reason to suppose that they would
be startled by an interpretation under which, if this condition does
not hold, the Rule would apply only to the part of the prior state-
ment that the witness does reaffirm.9"
cious, but many jurisdictions limit the testimony that may be given on this basis to "a
simple yes or no" in answer to the question "whether she made complaint that such an
outrage had been perpetrated upon her." Woods v State, 233 Ind 320, 326, 119 NE2d 558,
562 (1954).
Where the statement is not practically severable, a court might present the opponent
with a choice. For example, suppose the witness testifies at trial to a general proposition-
such as "He was angry"-and the prior statement offered to rehabilitate her does not quite
assert that proposition but instead asserts details from which the more general proposition
might be inferred-"He was red and shaking." The court might rule: "I'm either going
to admit Witness 2's testimony that Witness 1 said the accused was red and shaking, or
if you prefer I'll allow Witness 2 to testify [or stronger yet: admit a stipulation] that Witness
1 made a statement indicating that she then believed the accused was angry. Choose your
poison."
95Just the previous term, in Willianson v United States, 114 S Ct 2431 (1994), the Court
itself demanded fine shaving of a statement for purposes of applying a hearsay exemption.
Williamson held that the hearsay exception for declarations against interest, Rule 804(b)(3),
incorporates a narrow meaning of "statement," as "a single declaration or remark," so that
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In Tome, however, the Justices seem not to have questioned that
if the statement was validly offered to rebut a charge of "recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive" it would be admissi-
ble in its entirety.96 The Court gave no suggestion that it would
be troubled by the use of A.T.'s prior statements to sweep in a
great deal of substance to which she did not testify. But, of course,
the Court's holding was that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) does not remove
the hearsay objection to her statements. It is conceivable that the
Court was motivated by the overhang problem, but responded
obliquely by constructing an absolute premotive requirement. I
will turn now to the merits of that requirement.
lV. THE PREMOTIVE REQUIREMENT
If a witness made a pretrial statement of ACCUSATION
before an alleged improper influence arose, then ordinarily that
statement will tend strongly-though not absolutely 97-to prove
that the witness's trial testimony of ACCUSATION was not a
product of that influence. If, by contrast, the witness made the
prior statement after the influence arose, it usually will have little
or no probative value with respect to that question. Thus, many
pre-Rules authorities indicated that a statement could rehabilitate
a witness against a charge of improper motive only if the statement
was made before the motive arose.
In some circumstances, however, there is reason to believe that,
even though the prior statement was made after the improper in-
fluence allegedly arose, that influence had less impact on the wit-
ness when she made the prior statement than it did at trial. In
such circumstances, as Justice Breyer argued in his Tome dissent,
the prior statement might have significant probative value, not-
withstanding its timing, to rebut the charge of improper influence.
One example is a grudge, or other improper influence, that
builds over time.98 If in its earlier, weaker form the influence did
the Rule "does not allow admission of nonself-inculpatory statements, even if they are made
within broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory." Id at 2431. Time will tell to
what extent, if any, Williamson requires distinction among "We [understood to be Sam and
the declarant] robbed a bank on Friday morning," "Sam and I robbed a bank on Friday
morning," and "I robbed a bank on Friday morning. Sam helped."
"The Brief for the Petitioner did not challenge the point.
"' See note 89 (explaining why the inference is not absolute).
"'See Tome, 115 S Ct at 708 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
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not seem as likely as later to cause the witness to fabricate a story,
then it might have significant probative value in rebutting the
charge of improper influence.99
Second, although the influence may have reached full strength
by the time of the prior statement, the circumstances or manner
in which the witness made the statement might suggest that the
influence had little impact on her. Justice Breyer mentioned the
possibility that "the postmotive statement was made spontane-
ously."' 00 As the Court of Appeals suggested, this might have been
the case in Tome, though this conclusion depends on a view of
child psychology-on an assessment of the child's inability to con-
coct a plan of false statement or to recognize how it might advance
her interests-that is not self-evidently true.''
Third, even assuming that the witness fully understood how a
statement of ACCUSATION might advance her interests, it may
have appeared unlikely to her that this would occur in the particu-
lar setting in which she made the statement. Suppose, for example,
that the witness declared ACCUSATION to an intimate of hers,
someone whose hearing a truthful statement of ACCUSATION
would not hurt her and whose hearing a false statement of ACCU-
SATION would not help her. If the accused later contends that
the witness's trial testimony of ACCUSATION is a product of a
grudge, this prior statement should have rehabilitative value-even
if it was made after the grudge arose.02
91 The absolute premotive rule adopted by Tome can accommodate this situation, though
not in an entirely satisfactory manner. The influence could be deemed not to have arisen
for purposes of the premotive rule until such time as it appeared to achieve some level of
strength, presumably enough to make it likely that given the influence the witness would
declare ACCUSATION even without believing it. Put another way, the strength of the
influence could be treated as a binary, rather than continuous, function.
1oo 115 S Ct at 708. Rule 803(2) would remove the hearsay bar to some, but not all, such
statements. To satisfy that Rule, the statement must "relat[e] to a startling event or condi-
tion" and be "made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition."
"I See note 38 (Court of Appeals doubting ability of AT. to make statements as "the
result of a calculated scheme to deceive").
10, Thus, on some matters, an observer might have an incentive to lie to her boss or to
a court but not to her husband.
Again, a court eager to admit this statement under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), and yet purport
to adhere to an absolute premotive rule, might conclude that, although the grudge had
arisen, the particular motive to lie-to accomplish harm to the party opponent by making
a statement that would have operative force in litigation-had not But, of course, this
manipulation would weaken the premotive requirement.
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Sometimes, then, when a witness testifies to a given proposition
and the party opponent charges that she did so because of an im-
proper influence, a prior statement by the witness of that proposi-
tion might help rebut the charge even though the statement was
made after the influence arose. That does not indicate that all post-
motive statements, or even all those with such rebuttal value,
should be admitted-but it does cut sharply against an absolute ex-
clusion of those statements from the exemption granted by Rule
801(d)(1)(B).
In Tome, the Court belittled the significance of the probative
value of such statements in determining admissibility. Hearsay, it
pointed out, is often relevant, but is nevertheless presumptively
inadmissible."3 The argument was a strange one for the Court to
make, given that earlier in the opinion it had expressed doubts
about whether the policies underlying the hearsay rule apply to
the prior consistent statements of a witness at all°4-and it made
no attempt to argue that they do. Indeed, it could hardly do so
without questioning the position it had taken in the Geen-Nelson-
Owens line that cross-examination is not hindered by the fact that
a prior statement of the witness, rather than her current testimony,
is at stake.
What other arguments support an absolute premotive require-
ment? The history of the Rule is not conclusive, though pre-Rules
courts and commentators did frequently declare that only premo-
tive statements could be admitted for rebuttal purposes. As pointed
out by Justice Breyer, this view was not quite unanimous. 0 5 Per-
haps more significantly, it appears that the premotive rule was per-
ceived as simply a matter of relevance: A statement made after the
motive arose could not be admitted to rehabilitate, because it had
no rehabilitative value. Thus, McCormick on Evidence, in a passage
most of which the Court quoted in Tome, declared that
if the attacker has charged bias, interest, corrupt influence,
contrivance to falsify, or want of capacity to observe or remem-
ber, the applicable principle is that the prior consistent state-
103 115 S Ct at 704.
0RId at 701.
105 See id at 708 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
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ment has no relevancy to reflte the charge unless the consistent
statement was made before the source of the bias, interest, in-
fluence or incapacity originated.1"6
Ordinarily, this argument is sound, but it does not apply where
unusual circumstances, such as those described above, do give a
postmotive statement significant rehabilitative value. The pre-
Rules courts and commentators appear never to have squarely ad-
dressed the proposition that a postmotive statement could never
be admitted for rehabilitative purposes notwithstanding such cir-
cumstances."°7 Neither, for that matter, have post-Rules decisions
of the lower courts adopting a premotive requirement.'
Of course, arguably the Federal Rules, though extending the
rule on prior consistent statements to substantive as well as reha-
bilitative admissibility, took the prevailing rule as it was usually
articulated, and so incorporated the premotive requirement. Such
a reading of history, however, gives an unfortunate freezing effect
to the Rules. Before the Rules, I have suggested, a court atten-
tive to the policies underlying evidentiary rules and not merely
to casual statements of them should have been willing to con-
sider whether a particular statement had rehabilitative value even
though it was made after the improper motive arose. A post-Rules
court should not be precluded from such consideration unless the
intent of the drafters, or the language of the Rule itself, is very
clear.
The drafters' commentary to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is brief, clumsy,
106 Edward Cleary, gen ed, McCormick on Evidence § 49, at 105 (West, 2d ed 1972) (empha-
sis added). This passage was essentially identical in the first edition, by Charles T. McCor-
mick, § 49, p 108 (1954). See also John Henry VWigmore, 4 Evidence § 1128 at 268 (Little,
Brown, 4th ed, James H. Chadbourn, rev, 1972), quoted in Tome, 115 S Ct at 700 ("A
consistent statement, at a time prior to the fact said to indicate bias . . . will effectively
explain away the existence of a force of the impeaching evidence" (emphasis in original)).
107 At least those cited by the Court in Tome did not, nor have I found any that did.
" Some of these decisions have been very conclusory, with little or no discussion; see,
for example, United States v Henderson, 717 F2d 135, 138 (4th Cir 1983). Others have been
based on the propositions recited above, that a postmotive statement "is not relevant to
the rebuttal of a charge of recent fabrication" because "mere repetition does not imply
veracity." See, for example, United States v Bomnan, 798 F2d 333, 338 (8th Cir 1986) (char-
acterizing this as the reasoning of courts adopting premotive rule, and joining them); see
also note 106 (McCormick, Wigmore). As with respect to the older cases, this reasoning-
not so much a statement of an evidentiary rule as an exercise of logic about the most
common type of postmotive statement-does not address the occasional circumstance in
which a postmotive statement does have rehabilitative value.
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and uninformative.' 9 As for the text of the Rule, it certainly in-
cludes no explicit statement of a premotive requirement-such as
"to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of
fabrication or improper influence or motive that arose after the
statement was made." I do not believe the presence of the word
"recent" before "fabrication" in the Rule can be taken to mandate
such a requirement. Let us put aside the argument made by the
Government in Tome that "recent" is meant only to modify "fabri-
cation." Though the argument is not utterly implausible,"' neither
is it persuasive,' and Justice Breyer's formulation-that the state-
ment must show "that the witness did not recently fabricate his
testimony as a result of an improper influence or motive" -2 _
seems useful. Even on this reading, however, "recent" is notori-
ously ambiguous. If taken literally, it seems to address the temporal
relation of the fabrication, influence, or motive to the trial, not to
the statement. Moreover, it seems clear that the word cannot be
taken literally, in the dictionary sense of "occurring at a time im-
mediately before the present."".3 Thus, "recent" should be given
a construction that fits the rehabilitation idea underlying the Rule.
" See note 82.
10 Note that, as the Government in effect argued, Brief for the United States at 23-24,
"[recent fabrication] or [improper influence or motive]" reads more smoothly than "[recent]
[fabrication or improper influence or motive]." Indeed, pre-Rules sources suggest that "re-
cent" was attached to "fabrication" and not to "influence or motive." See M. C. Dransfield,
Annotation, Admissibility, for puipose of supporting impeached witness, of prior statements by him
consistent with his testimony, 75 ALR2d 909, 944 ("an examination of the later cases shows
that the time of making the consistent statements that are sought to be used to support
the credibility of the witness who has been impeached on the ground of having a motive
to falsify, or having recently fabricated his testimony, has played an important part in their
admissibility for such purposes").
" See Brief for Petitioner at 17 n 12. The "fabrication" seems to be a product of, rather
than on the same plane with, the "improper influence or motive."
1 115 S Ct at 707. See also Annotation, cited in note 110, 75 ALR2d at 944 ("a fabrica-
tion of recent date").
"' American Heritage Dictionmy 1508 (Houghton, Mifflin, 3d ed 1992). See, for example,
People v Singer, 300 NY 120, 124, 89 NE2d 710, 711 (1949) (rejecting an interpretation
of "recent" as meaning "that the witness' statements at the trial must have been assailed
as having been fabricated at some point just before the trial," and adopting "a relative, not
an absolute meaning," under which the opponent "is charging the witness not with mistake
or confusion, but with making up a false story well after the event. 'Recently fabricated'
means the same thing as fabricated to meet the exigencies of the case." (citations omitted));
Judith A. Archer, Note, Prior Consistent Statements: Temporal Admissibility Standard Under
FederalRule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), 55 Ford L Rev 759, 768-69 (1987) ("The term 'recent'
as used by FRE 801(d)(1)(B) indicates that the testimony was contrived at some point after
the impeaching event, rather than proximate to its being given at trial.").
[1995
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In my view, "arising recently enough that the prior statement re-
tains substantial rebuttal value" satisfies this standard and does
not distort the language. In most cases-but not in all-this con-
struction would be equivalent to "arising after the statement was
made."
V. RECONSTRUCTING RULE 801(d)(1)(B)
The arguments I have presented so far in this article sug-
gest that-assuming the prevailing structure of hearsay law-Rule
801(d)(1)(B) and its state counterparts should take on this shape:
First, the court should assess the rebuttal value of the prior state-
ment. Rebuttal value requires both need to rebut the charge and
effectiveness in doing so. Ordinarily, but not inevitably, a state-
ment made after the alleged improper influence arose will not be
effective in rebutting the charge that the witness's trial testimony
is the product of the influence. Second, if the prior statement ap-
pears to have substantial rebuttal value, the court should consider
factors weighing against admissibility of the statement. These in-
clude expenditure of time and, if the prior statement includes an
overhang of assertions not included in the witness's trial testimony,
the prejudice that this potentially creates, especially in hindering
the party opponent's ability to cross-examine the witness with re-
spect to those statements. If the negative factors are substantial,
the court should consider excluding the statement, redacting the
statement, or otherwise limiting the information that may be pre-
sented about it or the use that the jury may make of it.
How would this system work in Tome? If, as both the Court of
Appeals" 4 and the Supreme Court"5 believed, the charge of im-
proper influence was a weak one, the need for rebuttal was corre-
spondingly weak. The spontaneity of A.T.'s first statement, to her
babysitter Rocha, might give that statement some rebuttal value,
notwithstanding that the statement was made after the alleged in-
fluence arose. The subsequent pretrial statements, made after in-
terrogation of A.T. began, have far less rebuttal value, and their
14 3 F3d at 351; see note 38.
1,5 115 S Ct at 705 ("a rather weak charge that A.T.'s testimony was a fabrication created
so the child could remain with her mother").
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incremental value would be less still if the first statement were
admitted. Moreover, it was principally the subsequent statements
that added information not contained in A.T.'s trial testimony.
Though the first statement-"my father gets drunk and he thinks
I'm his wife"-added some substance to the current testimony,
this could easily be suppressed from Rocha's testimony. 16 Thus,
the trial court could have decided to admit the first statement, in
some form, but not the others. I do not mean to suggest that this
outcome would be indubitably correct, only that it would be plau-
sible, within the trial court's discretion.
But in Tome the Court perceived discretion itself as part of the
problem. The Court cited the Advisory Committee's concern that
making admissibility of hearsay depend entirely on a case-by-case
evaluation of probative value would make it too discretionary and
so too unpredictable. 7 The Committee's concern was valid, in my
view, principally because the Court has not been able to enunciate
a robust conception of the Confrontation Clause independent of
ordinary hearsay law. Even accepting that validity, however, it
seems for several reasons to have little bearing on this case.
First, the Committee's expressed concern was at a global level,
invoked in opposition to the idea that the prevailing structure of
doctrine, a presumptive exclusion of hearsay qualified by numerous
exemptions, should be replaced by a system generally dependent
on a balance of probative value and prejudicial potential. " ' But
recognizing the dangers of such a wide-open system does not pre-
clude allowing the trial courts a little bit of leeway so that they
I6 Moreover, in one respect the statement might significantly help Tome: A.T.'s state-
ment that her father "thinks I'm his wife" suggests a level of sexual awareness that one
might not expect in a girl of her age, making it far more plausible than otherwise might
be supposed that she fabricated a story of sexual abuse.
"7 115 S Ct at 704.
118
Abandonment of the system of class exceptions in favor of individual treatment
in the setting of the particular case, accompanied by procedural safeguards, has
been impressively advocated .... The Advisory Committee has rejected this ap-
proach to hearsay as involving too great a measure of judicial discretion, minimiz-
ing the predictability of rulings, enhancing the difficulties of preparation for trial,
adding a further element to the already overcomplicated congeries of pretrial pro-
cedures, and requiring substantially different rules for civil and criminal cases.
Advisory Committee's Introductory Note to Article VIII, quoted in part in Tome, 115 S
Ct at 704.
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can implement sensibly the narrow exemption provided by Rule
801(d)(1)(B). To quote Justice Cardozo, albeit far out of context,
"Discretion [given the construction I suggest] is not unconfined
and vagrant. It is canalized in banks that keep it from over-
flowing. 11
9
Second, even with a premotive requirement attached, Rule
801(d)(1)(B) is dependent on an exercise of discretion. Recall that
the predicate for application of the Rule, which allows use of the
prior statement for a hearsay purpose, is that the statement is ad-
missible for a rehabilitative purpose. But determining admissibility
for that nonhearsay purpose is a discretionary matter. Tome charac-
terized as "rather weak" the charge that A.T. had fabricated her
testimony so that she could live with her mother, and it com-
plained that "the Government was permitted to present a parade
of sympathetic and credible witnesses who did no more than re-
count A.T.'s detailed out-of-court statements to them."'20 Now
suppose A.T. had made all those statements at a time when, so far
as she knew, a change of custody arrangements was not in the
offing. Satisfaction of the premotive requirement might mean that
the earlier statements more clearly rebut the fabrication charge-
but that charge would be just as weak as in the actual case, meaning
that the parade of witnesses would be, if anything, even less neces-
sary and appropriate. Presumably the Court would not object to
the trial court's exercise of discretion to admit only one prior state-
ment in rebuttal. Allowing the trial court to discern rebuttal value
even in some postmotive statements would prevent some cases
from being decided by a shortcut rule, but it would not introduce
discretion to a realm where it had been foreign.
Third, one aspect of discretion under the construction I suggest
is concerned not with the premotive requirement but with the
overhang problem-the danger that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) will auto-
matically sweep into evidence prior accusatory statements that the
witness did not assert in her trial testimony and as to which the
accused has not had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine. If,
within the present framework of hearsay law, the only way of pre-
venting this is by an exercise of discretion, so be it.
'9 Panama Refining Co v Ryan, 293 US 388, 440 (1935) (dissenting opinion).
120 115 S Ct at 705.
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Fourth, we can anticipate that trial courts' attempts to reach sen-
sible results will continue to find an outlet; if Tome's absolute pre-
motive requirement precludes a candid exercise of discretion in
applying the Rule, trial courts will tend to manipulate the scope
of the requirement.'' In some cases, it may be that the principal
effect of Tome will not be to limit what trial courts do, but to
prevent them from being frank in doing it.
Finally, Tome itself makes explicit that, if a statement fails the
premotive requirement, it may nevertheless avoid the rule against
hearsay by the most discretionary route of all, the residual excep-
tion provided in Rule 803(24); indeed, the Court expressly invited
the Court of Appeals to consider whether A.T.'s prior statements
should be admitted pursuant to that Rule. 2 Rule 803(24) and its
virtually identical counterpart for unavailable declarants, Rule
804(b)(5), offer trial courts notoriously wide-open and virtually un-
controllable discretion to admit hearsay that does not fall within
any categorical exception. 121 When all is said and done, the admis-
sibility of a prior statement like those of A.T. will often depend
in large part on whether the trial court believes it to be truthful. 24
Tome's efforts to maintain bright-line rules in the hearsay realm
may look increasingly unrealistic as trial courts continue to indulge
themselves in the luxurious discretion provided by the residual
exceptions.
121 See notes 99, 102.
122 115 S Ct at 705.
13 See, for example, 3 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin, and Daniel J. Capra,
Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 1447-48 (6th ed 1994); Myrna S. Raeder, The Hearsay Rule
at Work: Has It Been Abolished De Facto by Judicial Discretion, 76 Minn L Rev 507 (1992).
1"4 The trial judge held that A.T.'s August 22 statement to Rocha was admissible alterna-
tively under Rule 803(24), but not her August 27 statements. He emphasized that the earlier
statement was spontaneous, that it was made to ask an adult for help, and that it related
to her current emotional state (though of course it narrated past facts). T 210-11.
On remand after the Supreme Court's decision, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has decided that the statements made to Ecklebarger and Rocha did not satisfy the
residual exception, principally because they were made too long after the events they de-
scribed. United States v Tome, 61 F3d 1446, 1451-54 (10th Cir 1995); apparently the Gov-
ernment did not argue for the admissibility of the statements to Padilla. Id at 1454-55.
The Court of Appeals held, however, that the statements to the three pediatricians were
admissible under Rule 803(4), as having been made for purposes of medical treatment or
diagnosis-even though A.T. presumably had no idea of the therapeutic or diagnostic value
of some of the information she provided, especially that identifying her assailant. Id at
1449-5 1. This latter issue, which drew a sharp dissent from Judge Holloway, could plausibly
bring the case back to the Supreme Court if Tome is found guilty on the retrial.
[1995
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VI. CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION
Tome deepens the ever-expanding thicket of hearsay law.12
In my view, the question that the Court actually decided was a
trivial one, and it gave an unduly rigid answer. The Court need
not have granted certiorari, for there was no blazing conflict
among the circuits. Courts rejecting a premotive requirement rec-
ognized that most often postmotive statements lack significant re-
habilitative value. And courts articulating the requirement did not
confront the issue of whether it really is an absolute one, to be
imposed even on the unusual postmotive statement that does have
such value, rather than merely a statement of the logic to be ap-
plied in the usual case. In adopting an absolutist rule, the Court
was supposedly motivated by fear of judicial discretion-but it put
its reliance on the most wide-open aspect of modem hearsay law,
the residual exceptions. Moreover, the Court sowed potential con-
fusion as to the nature of Rule 801(d)(1)(B). The Court's language
(inadvertently, I think) seems to treat the Rule as one setting out
the exclusive circumstances in which a prior consistent statement
may be used to rehabilitate the testimony of a witness. Lower
courts may infer from this that a statement that does not satisfy
the Rule may not be used for rehabilitation.
Tome is frustrating because, while the issue actually decided by
the Court was so narrow, the case itself highlights numerous
broader issues that must be addressed if hearsay law is to be im-
proved. The Tome Court cannot be faulted for failing to resolve
issues not actually presented to it, or to write a dissertation on the
law of hearsay. But it is fair game, I think, for commentary to point
to issues that, given an ideal hearsay system, might have played a
larger role in resolving the admissibility of A.T.'s prior statements.
In Tome, the Court showed no genuine recognition that, when
a witness's prior statement is admitted into evidence but the wit-
ness's testimony on direct or redirect does not confirm all the
substance of the statement, the opponent's opportunity to cross-
examine is severely limited. Indeed, given Green, Nelson, and
Owens, the Court felt no need to discuss the issue. The Court
"I See John M. Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 Vand
L Rev 741 (1961).
HeinOnline  -- 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 319 1995
320 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
never even mentioned Tome's constitutional right of confron-
tation.
More broadly, the Court showed no awareness at all of what I
have called the overhang situation, in which a prior statement of-
fered to rehabilitate a witness's testimony contains significant in-
formation not contained in the testimony. Thus, the Court never
addressed the possibility that a statement meeting this description
should be analyzed any differently from one that asserts only prop-
ositions to which the witness has testified.
I believe that recognition of these issues is necessary if prior
statements are to be addressed sensibly within the prevailing doc-
trine of hearsay law. But Tome also presents some factors that
might be significant in an attempt to put the law of hearsay and
confrontation into a fundamentally different framework.
First, Tome was a criminal defendant, and the prior statements
offered against him accused him of a crime. The Court put no
weight on these factors, which play no role in Rule 801(d)(1)(B).
But it seems to me that they make the admissibility of hearsay
suspect. In my view, the right to confront witnesses under the
Sixth Amendment should not apply to all hearsay declarants. But
if a declarant makes an accusatory statement, then ordinarily that
statement should not be admitted into evidence unless the accused
has had an opportunity to confront the declarant. A strong protec-
tion of the confrontation right not dependent on the manipulable
bounds of hearsay law 126 would, I believe, make it possible to take
a far more hospitable attitude toward hearsay when the confronta-
tion right is not at stake.
Second, A.T., the declarant, was a young child, both when she
made the statements and when she testified at trial. Perhaps her
understanding and cognitive abilities were so undeveloped when
she made the statements that, like a barking dog or a mechanical
instrument, she should not be considered a "witness" within the
meaning of the Confrontation Clause. Moreover, there is some
suggestion in the record that A.T.'s difficulty in testifying was at-
tributable to fear of Tome and that his wrongful conduct created
126 The Supreme Court has defined the confrontation right so as to make it nearly congru-
ent with the provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence on hearsay. See, for example,
White v Illinois, 502 US 346 (1992).
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this fear.127 If it could be shown to a high degree of confidence
that both these propositions were true, then perhaps Tome should
be held to have forfeited the right to object to admissibility of the
prior statements.
The presentation of these thoughts here is obviously very
sketchy, for it would take a series of other articles to explore them
in depth. But I believe that focusing on this type of issue (Was
the opportunity for cross-examination satisfactory? Is this the type
of declaration, and declarant, to which the confrontation right
should apply? Has the accused forfeited his right to object?) will
lead to a far more satisfying style of analysis of hearsay issues than
the mechanical approach reflected by Tome. If the law of hearsay
is to be reshaped, as many besides me have contended it should
be,128 a change in the Rules will certainly be necessary. But so too
will be a change in the law of confrontation. And in that respect,
reform depends on the Supreme Court. Most broadly, it can at-
tempt to define the confrontation right without relying on the per-
plexing categorizations of hearsay law. More narrowly, it should
recognize that the mere fact that the declarant of a prior statement
testifies at trial does not necessarily imply that the party opponent
has had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine.
2 7T 91 (prosecutor saying A.T. is "very frightened" of Tome), 143 (A.T. saying she is
afraid to go back to Tome), 162 (A.T. saying that she is afraid to live with him "[b]ecause
he did something bad"), 681, 687 (guardian ad litem testifying that in 1991, after A.T. had
been removed from Tome's custody, she was fearful of him and asked that visitation be
stopped).
28 See, for example, the articles and essays from the Minnesota Hearsay Reform Confer-
ence, 76 Minn L Rev 363-889 (1992).
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